Identifying barriers to Muslim integration in France by Adida, Claire L. et al.
Identifying barriers to Muslim integration in France
Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, Marie-Anne Valfort
To cite this version:
Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, Marie-Anne Valfort. Identifying barriers to Muslim integra-
tion in France. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of Amer-
ica , National Academy of Sciences, 2010, 107 (52), pp.384-390. <10.1073/pnas.1015550107>.
<halshs-00618060>
HAL Id: halshs-00618060
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00618060
Submitted on 14 Nov 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Identifying barriers to Muslim integration in France
Claire L. Adidaa, David D. Laitinb,1, and Marie-Anne Valfortc
aDepartment of Political Science, University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521; bDepartment of Political Science, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA 94305-6044; and cDepartment of Economics, Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne University, 75647 Paris Cédex 13, France
Contributed by David D. Laitin, October 20, 2010 (sent for review May 21, 2010)
This contribution is part of the special series of Inaugural Articles by members of the National Academy of Sciences elected in 2007.
Is there a Muslim disadvantage in economic integration for second-
generation immigrants to Europe? Previous research has failed to
isolate the effect that religion may have on an immigrant family’s
labor market opportunities because other factors, such as country of
origin or race, confound the result. This paper uses a correspondence
test in the French labor market to identify andmeasure this religious
effect. The results conﬁrm that in the French labor market, anti-
Muslim discrimination exists: a Muslim candidate is 2.5 times less
likely to receive a job interview callback than is his or her Christian
counterpart. A high-n survey reveals, consistent with expectations
from the correspondence test, that second-generation Muslim
households in France have lower income compared with matched
Christian households. The paper thereby contributes to both sub-
stantive debates on the Muslim experience in Europe and method-
ological debates on how to measure discrimination. Following the
National Academy of Sciences’ 2001 recommendations on combin-
ing a variety of methodologies and applying them to real-world
situations, this research identiﬁes, measures, and infers consequen-
ces of discrimination based on religious afﬁliation, controlling for
potentially confounding factors, such as race and country of origin.
Social and political relations between Europe and the Muslimworld are fractious (1, 2). Attacks in Madrid (March 2004)
and London (July 2005) were perpetrated by Muslim radicals.
Political parties in Europe have mobilized opinion against
a Muslim threat.a Relations between the countries and societies
of the European Union and the Muslim world have become
politically consequential on a number of dimensions: foreign
policy in regard to the Middle East, membership into the Eu-
ropean Union, and the vast migration of Muslim populations
into European Union states.
Surprisingly, several recent studies have found that there are
no special problems for Muslims in Europe. The Pew Global
Attitudes Project poll of 2006 established that “while there are
some signs of tension between Europe’s majority populations
and its Muslim minorities, Muslims there do not generally be-
lieve that most Europeans are hostile toward people of their
faith” (3).b Furthermore, “[s]ubstantial majorities of Muslims
living in the European countries surveyed say that [in the 2 years
after bombings in Spain and London, and the Cartoon Crisis in
Denmark (4)],c they have not had any personally bad experience
attributable to their race, ethnicity, or religion” (3, 5).d More
recently, the 2009 Open Society Institute multicountry study of
Muslim and non-Muslim attitudes toward immigration and social
cohesion reveals that Muslim respondents are as likely as non-
Muslim respondents to report that people in their neighborhood
are willing to help each other; only 10% of Muslim respondents
reported discrimination by the police, and a similar proportion of
Muslims (29.2%) and non-Muslims (31.1%) reported trust in the
government (6).e
At the same time, European states are deﬁned by their historic
nationalities, all of them in the Christian tradition, and are seen
as having a special problem with Islam going back to the fall of
Constantinople to the Ottomans and the reconquest of Spain in
the 15th century. Thus, throughout the continent, there is a myth
of a “Christian Europe” that is maintained despite its virtually
complete secularization in the past century. It manifests itself in
recent political events as well as in individual attitudes and
perceptions of discrimination. Suspicions run high in the debate
over the application of Turkey into the European Union (as
opposed to Bulgaria) (7).f Local issues, such as permits to build
minarets in European cities or prohibitions on women wearing
the burqa, transmogrify into continental causes célèbres. The
2009 Open Society Institute study paints a deteriorating picture
of religious and racial discrimination: 55.8% of Muslim respon-
dents and 43% of non-Muslim respondents, representing a plu-
rality, claim that there is more racial prejudice today than there
was 5 y agog; 68.7% of Muslim respondents and 55.9% of non-
Muslim respondents make that claim with regard to religious
prejudice, and more than 90% of both Muslim and non-Muslim
respondents agree that Muslims are the ones experiencing this
religious prejudice (6).
Thus, conventional wisdom points both to a cosmopolitan
Europe open to Muslim immigrants and a closed Europe suspi-
cious of these immigrants. Despite the sound and fury, the
question of whether there is a special Muslim problem for Europe
in general remains unclear. What is absent is a data-driven answer
that can adequately identify andmeasureMuslims’ failure/success
in economic integration into Europe.
The National Academies’ National Research Council’s Com-
mittee on National Statistics identiﬁed this problem on a broader
scale when it convened a panel of scholars in 2001 to provide
a comprehensive review of the major methods used to measure
racial discrimination, including statistical analysis of observa-
tional data, laboratory experiments, and ﬁeld experiments (8).
Although the panel argued that no one method can solve all the
troubling inferential problems for this notoriously complex issue,
the difﬁculties of relying on observational data, including omitted
Author contributions: D.D.L. designed research; C.L.A., D.D.L., and M.-A.V. performed
research; C.L.A., D.D.L., and M.-A.V. analyzed data; and C.L.A., D.D.L., and M.-A.V. wrote
the paper.
The authors declare no conﬂict of interest.
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This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.
1073/pnas.1015550107/-/DCSupplemental.
aFor example, the Front National in France, which runs an anti-European Union, antiglob-
alization, and anti-immigration platform, placed second in the presidential elections of
2002 and showed renewed strength in the regional elections of 2010.
bThe Pew Research Center for the People and the Press is a public opinion research
organization that studies attitudes toward politics, the press, and public policy issues.
This and subsequent quotations can be found at the Pew Global Attitudes Project Web
site (3).
cCartoons in a Danish newspaper that depicted the prophet in an unﬂattering manner set
off a wave of protests throughout the Islamic world as well as crystallizing anti-Muslim
feelings, to the beneﬁt of a right-wing party (the Danish People’s Party) that evokes anti-
Muslim sentiments.
dWork by Laurence and Vaisse (5) in France reports similar results. Muslim immigrants,
they ﬁnd, are not all that different from the historic nationalities of European states. In
general, they ﬁnd that the degree of anti-Islamism in police-reported incidents in France
is much lower than anti-Semitic ones, with a much larger Muslim population in France.
Those who are Islamophobic tend also to be anti-Semitic and antiimmigrant in general.
They conclude, at least for France, that there seems to be no speciﬁc anti-Islamic
public feeling.
eThis study (6) deﬁnes a Muslim as any respondent who self-identiﬁes as Muslim, includ-
ing Muslims who view themselves in a cultural rather than religious context. Similarly,
non-Muslims are respondents who do not deﬁne themselves as belonging to the
Islamic faith.
fThe New York Times reports that the European Union has ofﬁcially pictured Europe on
its Euro currency, including (Christian) Belarus, Moldova, and parts of Russia but not
Turkey, which ofﬁcials admit was stricken from the map (7).
gFor other non-Muslim responses on racial prejudice: 34.4% claimed that racial prejudice
is about the same today as it was 5 y ago, 15% claimed that racial prejudice is less today
than it was 5 y ago, and 7.6% do not know.
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variable and sample selection bias,h received special attention,
perhaps because at the time of writing, reliance on observational
data was thought to be used most often. Laboratory studies re-
ceived a number of important critiques as well, ranging from the
limits of external validity (the inability to generalize ﬁndings beyond
the laboratory context) to Hawthorne effects (whereby subjects
tend to behave differently under a microscope).
The mirror problems of observational and laboratory studies
led the panel to give considerable attention to ﬁeld experiments,
such as audit studies, which were praised as “an important and
useful means of measuring discrimination in various domains”
(8).i These studies have identiﬁed racial discrimination in the
housing market, in car sale negotiations, and in preapplication
behavior by lenders, among other economic transactions; yet they
can draw only limited inferences about racial discrimination.
Because it is not feasible to randomize a tester as to whether he or
she presents himself or herself as white or black, it is not possible
to claim conﬁdently that if tester “A,” who was black, were white,
he or she would have done better.
The panel therefore ﬁnds great value in combining features of
laboratory and audit studies. It reports on Bertrand and Mullaina-
than’s classic curriculum vitae (CV) experiment, today called a
“correspondence test,” in which the researchers created two iden-
tical resumés stratiﬁed by low- and high-skill levels, and assigned
awhite-sounding name to a randomhalf of the resumés and a black-
sounding name to the other randomhalf. The experiment generated
striking results. Applicants with white-sounding names received
50% more callbacks than applicants with black-sounding names.
Moreover, the return on quality of CV (i.e., reward for high-skill
level) was high for whites but nonexistent for blacks. The randomi-
zation of race assignment across otherwise identical resumés made
it possible to overcome the missing counterfactual and to draw
inferences on the effect of race. Because of the relative methodo-
logical success of this mixture of experiment and audit, the report
calls for greater research investment in the replication of laboratory
experiments “in real-world settings with real-world data” (8).
This paper pushes the agenda set by the National Academy of
Science panel report by addressing the issue of religious discrimi-
nation in Europe. It presents data on the relative success of a
matched set of second-generation Muslim and non-Muslim immi-
grants in France to see if, conditioned on human capital, they face
equal opportunities in the labor market, our criterion for economic
integration. By doing so, it accomplishes two important goals. First,
it contributes to a salient topical debate in a Europe struggling
to cope with an era of high religious identiﬁcation and massive
Muslim immigration.j Second, it addresses and resolves the
special methodological challenges involved in measuring re-
ligious discrimination. Indeed, identifying religious discrimina-
tion has inferential problems quite different from race, inasmuch
as the signal of one’s religion can be manipulated in front of an
employer or a real-estate agent in ways that are far more difﬁcult,
on average, for race. A bigger problem in identifying a religious
impact on employment opportunity is that of the confound that
exists between religion and country of origin. If people from
Turkey aremost likely to be ofMuslim heritage, how canwe tell if
labor market discrimination in Germany is attributable to sus-
picion of Turks or religious prejudice? Similarly, how would we
know if labor market discrimination in the United Kingdom is
attributable to bias against South Asians (from India, Pakistan,
and Bangladesh) or Muslims? In France, how might we differ-
entiate between prejudice against North Africans (Maghrebis)
and prejudice against Muslims?
This paper introduces a solution to such previously intractable
measurement problems. The resulting measure, if valid, would tell
us if for Muslim immigrants and their descendants in country X,
economic integration faces higher barriers than if everything about
these migrants were the same except for their religion. Using a
correspondence test in the French labor market and a matching
strategy that compares the relative success of two identical candi-
dates who differ only in their religious afﬁliation, this paper iden-
tiﬁes signiﬁcant anti-Muslim discrimination, controlling for a factor
(i.e., country of origin) that has confounded results in previous
work. Its principal ﬁnding is that, all other things being equal,
a Muslim candidate is 2.5 times less likely to obtain a job interview
than is his or her Christian counterpart. A high-n survey of immi-
grants selected via the same matching strategy (e.g., immigrants
from the same ethnic group but divided by religion) provides evi-
dence for a substantial income effect consistent with the expect-
ations derived from the correspondence test.
Previous Research on Employment Discrimination in France
Among Workers from Immigrant Families
Correspondence testing allows researchers to measure labor mar-
ket discrimination based on speciﬁc characteristics, such as gender,
age, race, or religion. A wide range of correspondence testing has
been conducted beyond the United States, starting with the ex-
periment of Jowell and Prescott-Clarke (9), which tested whether
applicants from Asian backgrounds were discriminated against in
the UK labor market. To our knowledge, four of these studies
focus on discrimination against immigrants in the French labor
market (10–13).k These studies compare the response rate re-
ceived by a CV with a Maghrebi-sounding ﬁrst and last name
with the response rate received by a CV with a French-sounding
ﬁrst and last name, with all other characteristics being equal
across these CVs. Applicants from a Maghrebi background were
found to be strongly discriminated against in the French labor
market compared with those from an “authentic” French back-
ground. For instance, Duguet et al. (11) compute that for every
100 positive responses for the authentic French candidate, the
Moroccan candidate received only 35, with the difference sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level.
Although these studies reveal substantial discrimination against
applicants of Maghrebi background, they do not allow us to iso-
late the source of this discrimination. Two confounding factors
are at stake: do employers discriminate against Maghrebis or
against Muslims?
The difﬁculties in identifying a religious effect as demonstrated
in theCVexperiments performed so far are not easily resolved, and
this is all the more so in surveys. Data on Muslims in France are
hard to get. A 1978 law set prohibitions on the collection of data on
the racial, religious, or ethnic identity of its citizens, creating chal-
lenges for demographic research. For instance, in a leading socio-
logical study of the economic success of different immigrant groups,
researchers could not distinguish the children of Algerian migrants
into France from the children of the pieds noirs, those of European
ancestry who left after Algerian independence in 1962 (14). Al-
though the law was partially relaxed in 2007, this type of data col-
lection has remained stringently limited (15–17).l
Equally important for the problem of statistical analysis, those
available mass surveys exempt from state oversight rarely (with
the Pew Global Attitudes Project poll being the partial excep-
hOmitted variable bias occurs when a correlation observed between two variables is
actually driven by each variable’s correlation with a third omitted variable. Sample
selection bias occurs when the experimenter chooses a nonrandom set of observations
(a subset of the data is systematically excluded) for statistical analysis.
iAudit studies measure discrimination directly via experimental ﬁeldwork (i.e., by intro-
ducing an experiment into a real-world context).
j
“There are estimated to be 15–20 million Muslims living in the E.U.”, nearly all of them
from post-World War II waves of migration (6).
kPublications by Foroni (12) and Cédiey et al. (13) are products of ISM-CORUM, a non-
governmental organization that provides services to and conducts research on French
immigrants. The experiment presented in this paper was administered by ISM-CORUM,
under the scientiﬁc direction of Eric Cédiey and David Laitin (http://www.ismcorum.org/).
lUnder Article 8 of the French Data Protection and Liberties Act (Loi informatique et
libertés) of 1978, the Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL) was
created as an independent administrative state authority to ensure that outside of the
national statistics agency [Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques
(Insee)], “personal data revealing directly or indirectly the racial or ethnic origin of
individuals” could not be processed [by government personnel or on government con-
tract] without consent. More information on data constraints in France can be found on
the CNIL Web page (15). In 2009, the Minister of Diversity and Equality of Opportunity,
Yazid Sabeg, with the full support of the president, adopted a different tack on the
collection of data on the ethnic and religious self-designation of French citizens, which
may prove to be a major breakthrough in future sociological analysis of the population.
A discussion of the vigorous debate that ensued was published (16). The Héran report
(17) was commissioned by the Minister.
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tion) include enough Muslims to allow for good data analysis.
For example, the World Values Survey included in its latest wave
for France only 47 reported Muslims out of a sample of 1,001.
Given that there are an estimated 6.3% Muslims in France, this
survey is hardly representative of the Muslim population (18).m
The real killer for identifying a Muslim effect is that most Muslim
immigrants to each of the major European states come from
a single country or world region. In Germany, nearly all Muslims
are from Anatolia; in the United Kingdom, the same is the case
with South Asians; and in France, nearly all Muslims are from the
Maghreb. In each of these cases, it is nearly impossible to de-
termine conclusively whether any additional problems that these
immigrant populations and their descendants have had in economic
mobility beyond the problems faced by non-Muslim immigrant
families are attributable to the fact that they are Muslim. For ex-
ample, nearly all immigrants to France from Portugal are Catholic,
and nearly all immigrants to France from Algeria are Muslim: once
they control for homeland, statistical models cannot distinguish
a religion from a country effect on outcomes. To look at the in-
ferential problem another way, any special problems in economic
advance faced by children of North African immigrants to France
may be attributable to their Muslim religion, the fact that they were
a colonized people from a geographic area where the major state
fought an insurgency against French imperialism, or some aspects
of North African life distinct from Islam (e.g., language, educa-
tional systems, history of authoritarian political rule).
To illustrate one aspect of the inferential problem, we draw
from a large-n survey of 12,010 randomly selected households
with an immigrant then (2002–2003) living in France, one of the
few large-n surveys in France in which a self-reported question
on religion was posed (19).n The survey also contains key in-
formation on the age, gender, education, region, country of or-
igin, and income of immigrant respondents. These data were
collected to study the retirement decisions of immigrants, but
they allow us to illustrate the problem of trying to infer the
effects of religion on income when there is a high correlation
between homeland and religion.
Consider Fig. 1, which analyzes these data, where models 1, 2,
and 3 illustrate the problem (the three statistical models are
described in the legend for Fig. 1). Model 1 estimates the
respondent’s income as a function of his or her religion, con-
trolling for gender, age, education, and length of stay in France.
With dummies for all religions (and Christianity the omitted
category, thereby serving as the point of comparison), we ﬁnd
that Muslim immigrants are signiﬁcantly poorer than Christian
immigrants. In model 2, we add home country ﬁxed effects,
a statistical technique that allows us to control for the immi-
grant’s homeland. In model 3, we do the same for region of
origin. The Muslim effect previously identiﬁed in model 1 loses
statistical signiﬁcance in models 2 and 3. Once we control for
country or region of origin, we are unable to identify a Muslim
effect, suggesting that the religious effect we measured in model
1 may actually be driven by some other cause related to a
respondent’s home country or region of origin rather than his or
her religion. If the goal is to identify an independent Muslim
effect on an immigrant’s economic integration, this study (as with
the previously reviewed CV studies) yields inconclusive results. A
different strategy is needed to address our questions.
Our Matching Strategy
Our approach is to use a matching strategy, targeting immigrant
groups that are divided religiously, with one portion of them being
Muslim and another portion, quite similar to the ﬁrst culturally,
economically, and in education, being Christian. [A literature
review on matching strategies can be found in the article by
Sekhon (20)]. Comparing the Muslims and Christians in each
group allows one to measure the “Muslim effect” without other
confounding factors, such as region or country of origin.
Proper matching requires that the two subsets of religiously
divided immigrant groups arrive at the host country with rela-
tively equal resources, or else the comparison would be biased.
Suppose the target population was the Lebanese population in
North America and the comparison were between Maronite
Christians and Sunni Muslims. Because the Maronites start off
earlier and with rich international networks of banking families,
a ﬁnding that Maronites achieve higher rates of economic suc-
cess would tell us little about comparative social and economic
barriers in the West attributable to religion (21).o Furthermore,
insufﬁcient overlap on initial income on arrival and on length of
residence in the United States would lead us to estimate, in
a statistical analysis, coefﬁcients that are model-dependent, and
would therefore limit our ability to make conﬁdent inferences
about the religious effect on immigrant integration.
Careful examination of selected small immigrant groups in
France, however, invites opportunities to get a reasonable ap-
proximation of an unbiased comparison. In our case, we identiﬁed
an estimated 10,000 immigrants in France with family back-
grounds as Joolas and Serers, two distinct ethnolinguistic com-
munities from Senegal (22).p These two groups, unlike all other
communities in Senegal, have a sufﬁciently large Christian pop-
ulation to allow for intragroup comparisons (23, 24).q Moreover,
contrary to what we observe for Lebanese Maronite Christians
and Sunni Muslims, Senegalese Christians did not beneﬁt from
the earlier settlement of a Senegalese Christian diaspora in
France. To conﬁrm this, we rely on a survey administered by
David Laitin with the French ﬁrm Conseils-Sondages-Analyses
(CSA), in which 511 Serers and Joolas, both Christians and
Muslims, were polled on a variety of issues concerning their in-
tegration in France. Data from that survey indicate that the time
elapsed since the settlement of the ﬁrst migrant is 39 y for Sene-
galese Christian families and 39.3 y for Senegalese Muslim fam-
ilies. This difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.r Furthermore,
there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference in the distribution of
years of arrival in France between the two groups.
A rather common impression among the French population
(and especially among the French population of Maghrebi origin)
is that AfricanMuslims are not “real”Muslims because they know
little to no Arabic and interact indiscriminately with African
Muslims and African non-Muslims (25). Our choice of a target
mThe World Values Survey (18) is a global network of social scientists who have surveyed
the basic values and beliefs of the publics of more than 80 societies on all six inhabited
continents. Note that only 497 respondents reported their religion; thus, Muslims rep-
resented 9.9% of those who reported their religion. Still, the sample size of 47 limits the
degrees of freedom necessary for careful statistical controls.
nThe Passage à la Retraite des Immigrés (PRI) project (19) was carried out under the
direction of Claudine Attias-Donfut, in collaboration with Rémi Gallou and Alain Ro-
zenkier, with funding from the Agence nationale pour la Cohésion Sociale et l’Egalité
des chances (ACSE), Agricarrco, Mutualité Sociale Agricole (MSA), and Caisse des Mines.
This PRI project, completed in 2003 by the Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse and
the Insee, examines the factors and mechanisms that characterize immigrants’ transition
into retirement. Respondents were randomly selected from the Insee Census of 1999,
from the baseline population of households with at least one immigrant member be-
tween the ages of 45 and 70 y at the time of the survey administration. The resulting
sample comprises 6,211 respondents, 46.4% of whom are women, with a mean of 55.8 y
of age and a median of 55 y of age. It is representative of the immigrant population
residing in metropolitan France in 2003, that is, of all foreign-born immigrants in the
selected age range. Although the data remain private, the authors kindly provided the
data permitting our analysis in Fig. 1 and Table S1.
oAccording to the “Detroit Arab American Study” (21), Christian Lebanese immigrants
arrived in the United States, on average, 10 y earlier than Muslim Lebanese immigrants.
Furthermore, 58% of Christians of Lebanese origin were born in the United States com-
pared with a mere 18% of Muslims of Lebanese origin.
pWe include Manjaks, a closely related linguistic group, with the Joolas (22).
qFrom the 2002 Senegalese census (23), 25% of the Joolas and 11% of the Serers are
Christian, whereas only 5% of the Senegalese population as a whole is Christian (24). It is
worth noting that these Christian population shares are rather low. This raises a possible
concern that the French assume all members of these communities are Muslim. Experi-
mental evidence revealing that French hosts tend to misattribute Islam to all black
Africans will be presented in future work. This misattribution would mean that the
effects we identify via our matching strategy are actually biased downward. If anything,
the real size of anti-Muslim discrimination is even greater than what we measure here.
rThis survey was conducted in 2009 under contract by CSA France, in a project in which
David Laitin, Yann Algan, and Vincent Tiberj were the principal investigators. There were
511 respondents from Serer or Joola backgrounds (with 509 giving a clear indication as to
whether their household is Muslim or Christian). The survey had 29% Christian respond-
ents and 71% Muslim respondents. Descriptive statistics of the survey are provided in
Table S2. Hereafter, this survey will be referred to as the Laitin/CSA survey.
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population less spontaneously associated with Islam in the French
collective imagination, however, would lead to an underestima-
tion of anti-Muslim discrimination. Our results should thus be
interpreted as a lower bound on the magnitude of anti-Muslim
discrimination: levels of discrimination among Maghrebis, the
real Muslims who are at the center of public debates about the
role of Islam in France, would almost certainly be even higher
than those we ﬁnd for Senegalese Muslims.
Keeping with the matching strategy outlined above to separate
out region of origin and religion, our experimental design deman-
ded three comparable CVs, two of them from women with an
obvious Senegalese surname (Diouf) but one with a well-known
Muslim ﬁrst name (Khadija) and the other with a well-known
Catholic ﬁrst name (Marie). The third CV was from a woman with
a typical French republican name, with no religious connotation
(Aurélie Ménard). In addition to differences in the ﬁrst names, we
introduced two signals of religious identity related to the work and
volunteer experiences of our ﬁctitious candidates. One of Khadija’s
past positions was with Secours Islamique and one of Marie’s was
with Secours Catholique, whereas Aurélie worked solely in secular
ﬁrms. Also, Khadija did voluntary work for the Scouts Musulmans
de France, whereas Marie did the same for the comparable Cath-
olic organization, Scouts et Guides de France.s
The remaining qualiﬁcations and backgrounds were identical
for all three applicants: all were single French citizens, 24 y of
age, and had 2 y of postsecondary education and 3 y of experi-
ence on the job market in either secretarial or accounting sec-
tors. We deliberately chose occupations that entailed interaction
with clients or company partners, such that recruiters would be
paying greater attention to the expected reactions of these po-
tential clients to their employees.
The non-governmental organization, Inter Service Migrants -
Centre d’Observation et de Recherche sur l’Urbain et ses
Mutations (ISM-CORUM), collected job announcements na-
tion-wide for both types of occupations published on the Pôle
Emploi Web site (the French national employment agency)
during the spring of 2009. For each pair of job announcements
matched by region, sector, company size, and position, ISM-
CORUM administrators sent the Aurélie/Khadija candidate pair
to one and the Aurélie/Marie candidate pair to the other. Aur-
élie Ménard was used principally as the “reference” candidate:
her CV allowed us to avoid sending Marie and Khadija’s appli-
cations for the same position. Because these applications were
identical in both form and content (except for the religious
identity signals), sending both CVs would have inevitably awak-
ened suspicion among recruiters.t
Fig. 2 summarizes our results. We ﬁrst observe that the ref-
erence candidate, Aurélie Ménard, received the same positive
response rate from employers who received Marie’s CV and
from employers who received Khadija’s CV (27% and 25% re-
spectively, with no statistically signiﬁcant difference between the
two). This indicates that the companies receiving Marie’s CV
were, on average, similar to those receiving Khadija’s CV, thus
lending greater conﬁdence to our comparison of Marie and
Khadija’s positive response rates.
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Regression Coefficient
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Model (3) 
With Region F.E.
Fig. 1. Impact of religion and geographic origin on a household’s yearly income. This ﬁgure is based on results in Table S1. The dependent variable is an ordinal
variable ranging from the value “0” if the yearly household income is null to “14” if the yearly household income is greater than 68,000 Euros. The independent
variable is whether the respondent is “Muslim,” a binary variable, which takes the value “1” if the head of household is Muslim and “0” otherwise. In model 1, Muslim
is signiﬁcant at the P < 0.01 signiﬁcance level on a two-tailed test. It is not signiﬁcant by conventional standards in model 2 and inmodel 3. As for controls, “Female” is
a binary variable, which takes the value “1” if the head of household is female and “0” if the head of household is male. “Age” is a continuous variable equal to the
actual age of the head of household. “Education” is an ordinal variable ranging from the value “1” for no schooling to “6” for postsecondary education. “Jewish” is
a binary variable, which takes the value “1” if the head of household is Jewish and “0” otherwise. “Asian” is a binary variable, which takes the value “1” if the head of
household is Buddhist, Hindu, Shintoist, or Confucianist and “0” otherwise. “Atheist” is a binary variable, which takes the value “1” if the head of household is an
atheist and “0” otherwise. The reference group is “Christian,” a binary variable, which takes the value “1” if the head of household is Christian and “0” otherwise.
“Yrs France” is a continuous variable equal to the number of years that the head of household has lived in France. SEs in the original probit model are robust. In the
ﬁgure, the dot represents the regression coefﬁcient, the horizontal line marks the 95% conﬁdence level, and the two vertical lines mark the 90% conﬁdence level. F.E.
refers to ﬁxed effects.
sThe ﬁrst two organizations are both independent nongovernmental organizations in
France with extensive international networks dedicated to the eradication of poverty.
Neither has an obvious religious agenda. Their Web sites are http://www.secours-
catholique.org/ and http://www.secours-islamique.org/. As for the volunteer work, the
two organizations are listed as religiously afﬁliated branches of an international scouting
federation (http://www.sgdf.fr/ and http://scoutsmusulmans.fr/).
tExemplars of the three CVs are available in “Les Français musulmans sont-ils discriminés
dans leur propre pays?” (http://frenchamerican.org/cms/webfm_send/164).
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The difference between Marie and Khadija’s positive response
rates is striking. Although Marie Diouf received a positive re-
sponse rate of 21%, Khadija Diouf received a positive response
rate of only 8% (Fig. 2A). This 13-percentage point difference is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level and indicates
that for every 100 positive responses received by Marie Diouf,
Khadija Diouf received only 38 positive responses, or 2.5 times
less.u Furthermore, these results hold in a multivariate regression
controlling for regional differences, employment sector, com-
pany size, occupation, contract type, and whether or not the CV
included a photograph.v Notably, the ﬁrst 214 applications we
sent had no pictures of the candidates. The next 61 included the
same picture for the two Dioufs as a signal that they were not
North Africans. Furthermore, there were no religious symbols in
the photographs, indicating to recruiters that Khadija Diouf is
not an orthodox Muslim. The results with and without the
photographs were not statistically different from each other. This
experiment thus provides a clear indication that in at least one
sector of the French labor market and controlling for the can-
didate’s ethnicity among other characteristics, there is signiﬁcant
religious discrimination.
Consequences of Religious Discrimination
Does the discrimination experienced by Muslim candidates in the
French labor market correspond to an economic disadvantage
on the part of Muslim immigrants relative to their Christian
counterparts? To answer this question, we rely on the Laitin/CSA
survey of 511 Senegalese Christians and Senegalese Muslims liv-
ing in France in 2009. We previously established that these two
groups immigrated into France in a single wave during the 1970s.
To ensure a fair comparison, we must also ask whether the ﬁrst
immigrants of respondent families to France started out on equal
footing. The only critical difference on the arrival in France of
Senegalese Muslims and Senegalese Christians relates to educa-
tion. Senegalese Christians were slightly more educated than
Muslims: whereas the probability of having a secondary or a post-
secondary education is 36% among Senegalese Christians, it is
27% among SenegaleseMuslims (a difference that is signiﬁcant at
the 95% conﬁdence level).w These results are consistent with
ethnographic accounts of Senegalese Christians’ access to better
Marie Diouf vs. Aurélie Ménard Khadija Diouf vs. Aurélie Ménard
etar esnopser evitiso
P
0.0
1.0
2.0
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Aurélie Ménard
−10 30
Difference in 
positive response rate:
Aurélie Ménard vs. Khadija Diouf
Difference in 
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 Aurélie Ménard vs. Marie Diouf
A
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●
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Fig. 2. (A) Substantive effect of Khadija Diouf vs. Marie Diouf. (B) Statistical signiﬁcance of the Khadija Diouf effect. This ﬁgure is based on results in Table S3
from Dataset S1. In B, the dot represents the difference in response rates, the horizontal line marks the 95% conﬁdence level, and the two vertical lines mark
the 90% conﬁdence level.
uWe code a response as positive when the candidate receives a call or an e-mail back from
the employer inviting her for an interview, and we code a response as negative when
a candidate receives no response from the employer or when the employer calls her back
to turn her down. Our focus on callbacks as the outcome of interest may lead us to
underestimate the extent of anti-Muslim discrimination in this context, if we believe that
French companies face pressure to demonstrate that they are not discriminating against
minorities: Muslims may receive callbacks so that the ﬁrm appears not to discriminate
against them. This bias, if true, would work against ﬁnding an anti-Muslim effect, thus
reinforcing our conﬁdence that our result represents a lower bound on the extent of
anti-Muslim discrimination.
vThe ordered probit estimation is not shown but is available from the authors.
wData from the 2002 Senegalese census (23), which will be reported on in a future
paper, reveal precisely the same degree of educational difference between the subset
of Muslim and Christian Joolas and Serers who have a relative living in Europe. A total
of 57% of Muslim respondents who had a relative in Europe had only a primary or
middle school education, whereas 42% had higher levels of education. For Christians,
the ﬁgures are 53% for only primary or middle school education and 47% for more
advanced levels of education. These differences are signiﬁcant at the 99% level but
are not radically different substantively. These data add conﬁdence that the Laitin/
CSA survey was representative of the two ethnolinguistic migrant groups in France.
Adida et al. PNAS Early Edition | 5 of 7
PO
LI
TI
CA
L
SC
IE
N
CE
S
IN
A
U
G
U
RA
L
A
RT
IC
LE
quality education through their religious network (i.e., Catholic
schools). A proper matching strategy between Senegalese Chris-
tians and SenegaleseMuslims thus requires that we control for the
ﬁrst migrant’s level of education, which, given their high overlap in
educational achievement, is statistically feasible.
We can now ask, controlling notably for the educational level
of the ﬁrst migrant, whether Senegalese Christians have been
more successful in breaking through social and economic glass
ceilings in France than have Senegalese Muslims. With this pro-
cedure, we are conﬁdent that any differences found between the
two groups are the result of some aspect of their religious up-
bringing or practice, because geographic origin does not vary and
initial human capital is controlled for.x
We estimate the determinants of immigrant income in France
today via an ordered probit regression with robust SEs, with the
current monthly household income as the dependent variable. The
explanatory variables are the religious tradition of the household,
the head of household’s gender and educational level, and the
educational level of the head of household’s ancestor who was the
ﬁrst to come to France. (Recall that there is no need for a second
model with country ﬁxed effects because all respondents are from
Senegal. This is the key to our matching strategy.) As illustrated in
Table S4, we ﬁnd that households with a Christian religious tradi-
tion are signiﬁcantly richer than households with aMuslim religious
tradition (signiﬁcant at the 99% level).y More precisely, when we
estimatemarginal effects and hold all other explanatory variables in
the model at their predicted sample mean, the results indicate that
Muslim households make, on average, 400 Euros less than Chris-
tian households each month, the equivalent of 15% of the average
monthly income or 17% of the median monthly income for France
in 2007 (26).z Fig. 3 further illustrates the effect of household re-
ligion for each income category: it indicates that Muslim house-
holds are more likely to fall into lower income categories, whereas
Christian households are more likely to fall into higher income
categories. In sum, even controlling for the educational level of the
ﬁrst migrant to France, there is a signiﬁcant negative Muslim effect
on present day household income. We can therefore infer that the
job discrimination revealed in the section on our matching strategy
has broad implications for differences in today’s household income
for Muslims.
Summary and Extensions
In this paper, we have shown that both public debate and pre-
vious research on the implications of religious difference for
integration into Europe, and France in particular, have yielded
ambiguous results. Relying on a matching strategy and replicat-
ing well-understood CV experiments, we have been able to
identify a statistically and substantively strong level of religious
discrimination in at least one sector of the French labor market.
Relying on that same matching strategy but now through a large-
n survey of the descendants of Senegalese migrants into France,
we are able to show one potential implication of job discrimi-
nation, namely, that over two generations Muslims have done
less well economically than comparable Christians.
Some big questions remain unanswered, however. We still have
not identiﬁed the mechanisms by which Muslims face relative
economic failure. Consider the results on job discrimination. They
may reﬂect a “taste” that français de souche (rooted French),
those with four grandparents born within the French hexagon,
have for fellow Christians. They may reﬂect instead an ability of
Senegalese Christians to communicate trust and desire to succeed
better than Senegalese Muslims, who lack comparable civic con-
nections (e.g., through the Church) with French people. Alter-
natively, they may reﬂect cultural practices of Muslims that signal
to French employers a lower commitment to the job.
To address these core questions onmechanisms and relying on
the same matching strategy, we have conducted a range of eth-
nographic interviews and experimental game-theory inter-
ventions focusing on the behavior of Senegalese Christians and
Senegalese Muslims toward the French and vice versa. Our
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Fig. 3. Total income effect of Christian vs. Muslim household (Hh). This ﬁgure is based on results in Table S4 from Dataset S2 and its codebook (Dataset S3).
Predicted probabilities of reaching each income category are calculated for each household. They are then averaged out for Christian households and for
Muslim households for cases in which all other independent variables in the model are at their Christian/Muslim household mode. This captures the total
effect on household income of being a Christian household vs. a Muslim household. Similar graphs were produced (i) holding all other variables at the sample
mode, (ii) holding all other variables at their Christian/Muslim household mean ± 1 SD, and (iii) holding all other variables at the sample mean ± 1 SD. All
present the same pattern as that illustrated here.
xWe assume here that an individual’s education captures human capital. This may not always
be the case, for example, if a virtuous cycle exists between an individual’s human capital
and his or her community’s human capital. In this case, the gap in income that we identify
may be attributable to differences in the communities’ levels of human capital. However,
without a measure of community level of human capital, we cannot control for this here.
yIn Table S4, the variables “Gender of head of household” and “Educational level of head
of household” introduce a number of missing observations. When we run the regression
with only “Christian household” and “Educational level of ﬁrst migrant” on the right-
hand side, our observations increase to 372 and the effect of Christian household con-
tinues to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant. When we look at the respondents who
are excluded from the analysis because of missing data, we ﬁnd that 23% of them are
Muslims (compared with 16.5% Christian) and that they are poorer than the average
respondent. Hence, the bias introduced by missing data is likely to result in an underes-
timation of the negative Muslim effect on household income.
zThe average annual household income in 2007 was 33,100 Euros (or an average monthly
income of 2,758 Euros); the median annual household income in 2007 was 27,630 Euros
(or a median monthly income of 2,302 Euros) (26).
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subsequent papers for this project will assess the explanatory
power of these different mechanisms. Future research ought also
to compare matched populations in other European states to see
if state policies (e.g., multiculturalism vs. republicanism) differ in
their success in fostering the integration of Muslim populations.
In this paper, relying on models that combine the controlled
conditions of an experiment with a large-N survey, we have es-
tablished a clear, albeit uncomfortable, ﬁnding. All other things
being equal, Muslims have faced barriers to economic integra-
tion in France that are higher than they would have been if ev-
erything about them were the same save for their religion.
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